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Shared opinions are an important feature in the formation of social groups. In this paper, we use the
Axelrod model of cultural dissemination to represent opinion-based groups. In the Axelrod model,
each agent has a set of features which each holds one of a set of nominally related traits. Survey data
has a similar structure, where each participant answers each of a set of items with responses from a
fixed list.
We present an alternative method of displaying the Axelrod model by representing it as a bipartite
graph, i.e., participants and their responses as separate nodes. This allows us to see which feature-trait
combinations are selected in the final state. This visualisation is particularly useful when representing
survey data as it illustrates the co-evolution of attitudes and opinion-based groups in Axelrod’s model
of cultural diffusion.
We also present a modification to the Axelrod model. A standard finding of the Axelrod model
with many features is for all agents to fully agree in one cluster. We introduce an agreement threshold
and allow nodes to interact only with those neighbours who are within this threshold (i.e., those with
similar opinions) rather than those with any opinion. This method reliably yields a large number of
clusters for small agreement thresholds and, importantly, does not limit to single cluster when the
number of features grows large. This potentially provides a method for modelling opinion-based
groups where as opinions are added, the number of clusters increase.
INTRODUCTION
To understand the societal structure of opinions,
or attitudes, it is necessary to model the emergence
of the groups that bind them. Much research demon-
strates that people evaluate and understand their en-
vironment with reference to relevant social groups
[1–3]. Importantly, shared opinions and beliefs are
a defining feature of social groups [4, 5] and group
identity can be fostered by coordinating attitudes. In
particular, opinion-based groups are social structures
in which people are connected by the opinions they
share; and clusters of opinions become interlinked
signifiers of group identity when they are jointly held
by the members of a group [6].
In this paper we demonstrate that an adapted ver-
sion of Axelrod’s model of cultural dissemination
[7] can be used to model opinion-based groups. Ax-
elrod modeled people as each holding one of several
available traits for each of several features. The in-
dividual’s culture is defined as their combination of
traits; and multiple individuals are said to share the
same culture if they are spatial neighbours who share
the exact combination of traits. We remove this spa-
tial constraint when identifying clusters and instead
get groups of agents sharing the same traits for each
feature, we refer to these as opinion-based groups.
The social structure of opinion-based groups has
similar properties to Axelrod’s model. Specifically,
agents in Axelrod’s model are linked according to
the values they hold (which Axelrod called “traits”)
on a given number of cultural ”features”. Opinion-
based groups are formed by people holding a par-
ticular selection of attitudes. In principle, conceptu-
alising Axelrods nominal cultural features and traits
as ordinal attitudes will allow us to model the emer-
gence of opinion-based groups with a data struc-
ture that maps cleanly on to raw survey data. Note
that opinion surveys typically use ordinal Likert-
type response items (e.g. an item with several re-
sponse options from Strongly Disagree to Strongly
Agree). While these are frequently treated as in-
terval data in analyses (ie. assuming consistent in-
tervals between scale points and allowing arithmetic
operations such as addition and subtraction), there is
a strong argument that individual Likert-type items
should properly be treated as ordinal, allowing only
non-arithmetic operations [8]. The original Axelrod
model of cultural dissemination relies only on swap-
ping, and our adaptions adds ranking, making it an
excellent fit with Likert-type data.
The tendency toward consensus in the standard
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2Axelrod model poses a further problem for mod-
elling the emergence of opinion-based groups with
attitudinal surveys. Specifically, it has been shown
that for the final state to have many clusters, a high
initial number of traits q is required [9]. Given
that attitudinal surveys naturally assess more at-
titudes than response-options, an Axelrod simula-
tion of such data would converge towards unifor-
mity. However, in real social systems survey data
frequently reveals stable systems of cultural diver-
sity [10]. Our adaptation of the Axelrod model is
intended to account for diversity in the structure of
opinion-based groups. The idea to use surveys with
the Axelrod model is not new, for example, [11] use
survey data to set the initial states of the agents. In
this paper, however, we approach this as a theoret-
ical model and do not use empirical data as in, for
example, [12–14].
There have been many variations on the standard
Axelrod model (some even proposed in the original
paper) often attempting to promote multiculturality.
Some examples of variations are the introduction of
noise [15], changing the topology from a lattice to
a complex network [16], the effect of media repre-
sented by an external field [17], and, more recently,
modelling it on a multi-layer network where only in-
teractions can occur between nodes on specific lay-
ers [18]. Another variation treats each feature as a
continuous variable which pull closer together when
they agree or repel when they disagree [19]. This is
similar to the Deffuant model [20] with more than
one feature.
Here, we take a similar approach to the idea of
bounded confidence. In this type of model, an agent
only takes account of a neighbour’s opinion if it is
within a certain interval of that [21]. We treat each
specific feature as having a discrete value associated
with it. We then only allow an interaction when the
traits are within a certain distance from each other.
This corresponds with research from social psychol-
ogy which demonstrates that social judgements me-
diate attitude change [22]. For example, according
to social judgment theory [21], the amount of atti-
tude change caused by an interaction should depend
on the perceived distance between the communica-
tion and the respondent’s original view. Specifically,
at any given time there is a range of positions each
person is open to holding, known as the latitude of
acceptance”. Importantly, this range is anchored by
one’s current opinion. Similarly, decision making re-
search demonstrates that people tend to display bias
in evaluating evidence by favouring views that cor-
respond to their existing attitudes [22]. For example,
empirical evidence shows that people rate arguments
as more compelling when they correspond to previ-
ously held attitudes [23]. In summary, it is likely that
interaction does not always lead to assimilation and
that social influence is anchored by existing opin-
ions.
This is similar to the approach in [24] but on
the traits instead of the features. In general, if the
number of features are much higher than the number
of traits, there will be consensus, however, bounded
confidence has been suggested as a method for com-
pensating for this [11]. Similarly, [25] show that
adding influence between those with similar options
is sufficient for cultural diversity. A model similar
in spirit in [26] uses an open-mindedness parameter,
if two clusters are similar then there is higher prob-
ability they will coalesce, there is also a probability
a group will fragment. This open-mindedness pa-
rameter is similar to the bounded confidence thresh-
old. A model, with only binary options for the traits
inspired by the Axelrod model with bounded con-
fidence can also lead to multiple clusters [27]. A
key difference in the model we present to other ap-
proaches that use bounded confidence on the Ax-
elrod model is we take this threshold into account
when computing who an agent can interact with, and
then again when seeing if they are converted. This
only introduces a single parameter and does not re-
strict the number of traits.
In this paper, we firstly use bipartite network vi-
sualisations to identify opinion-based group struc-
ture in the standard Axelrod model. Secondly, we
introduce an agreement threshold similar to the no-
tion of bounded confidence. Axelrod’s original in-
teraction mechanism was based on the principle of
homophily – “the likelihood that a given cultural
feature will spread from one individual to another
depends on how many other features they may al-
ready have in common.” If the nominal traits avail-
able to each agent are ordered then there is another
dimension for homophily. A small modification to
the interaction rules allows us model the types of
survey-based data evident in the field of opinion-
based groups.
3FIG. 1. An Axelrod simulation on a lattice withN = 100,
F = 3 features and q = 5 traits paused after 40,000 time
steps (i.e. not final state).
METHODS
Standard Axelrod model
In the social sciences, attitudinal surveys are the
most common way of measuring individual opin-
ions. We wish to model participants holding atti-
tudes and the groups they form as a result. To do this
we start with with Axelrod’s model of cultural diffu-
sion [7]. Here, each agent takes a position on a set of
features; and that position must be one of a fixed set
of traits. We begin by visualising this model using
a bipartite graph – a graph with two types of nodes
where edges must connect nodes of different types.
One type of node represents the agents and the other
represents their trait on a specific feature.
The original Axelrod model on a lattice (with-
out periodic boundary conditions) works as fol-
lows: Each individual has a feature set F =
{f1, f2, ..., fF } where fk is each specific feature.
There are a total of F = dim(F) features and each
feature fk has q traits (initially assigned at random).
At each time-step, individual i and one of its neigh-
bours j are chosen at random. With a probability
equal to the number of common features over the to-
tal number of features, person i will copy one of the
traits they do not have in common with j.
Fig. 1 shows the Axelrod model for 100 nodes
on a lattice with F = 3 and q = 5 paused after
40,000 time steps. The absence of a line represents
all five features in common, dotted lines represent
three or four features in common, dashed lines rep-
resent one or two shared features and a thick solid
f1_q1 f1_q2 f1_q3 f1_q4 f1_q5
f2_q1 f2_q2 f2_q3 f2_q4 f2_q5
f3_q1 f3_q2 f3_q3 f3_q4 f3_q5
FIG. 2. The bipartite representation of the Axelrod sim-
ulation in Fig. 1 after 40,000 time-steps with F = 3 fea-
tures (different colours) and q = 5 traits displaying which
feature-trait combinations are selected.
line represents no features in common. When multi-
ple clusters are found, the lattice is divided into re-
gions which are physically separated from each other
as seen here. A cluster with no edges indicates that
those nodes all have the exact feature configuration.
A bipartite network representation of the same
data is shown in fig 2. Here, the underlying feature-
trait combinations are revealed, with each feature
displayed using a different colour. For example, we
observe that features 1 and 2 both have a majority
but feature 3 is split between q = 1 and q = 4. This
is particularly useful if using this network to repre-
sent survey data. If there are three questions with a
five-scale response, it is clear which response is the
most favoured per question.
Projections can be taken from this representation
to show which feature-trait combinations are fre-
quently held together (see for example fig. 4) and to
show the opinion-based groups that form (see fig. 5).
In the latter projection, if just full agreement edges
are shown (i.e. where the agent share the same traits
for each features), this gives the clusters usually dis-
cussed. If this is reduced to one minus the full agree-
ment, it will display clusters who agree on all but one
trait. An example of this can be seen in fig. 5 where
different coloured edges represent different levels of
agreement between the clusters.
4AGREEMENT THRESHOLDS ON THE TRAITS
One key difference between survey data and the
Axelrod model is that in the Axelrod model the traits
for a given feature are nominally related (i.e. not
ordered) but in survey data the response options are
related to one another, or on a scale (e.g., a Likert-
type scale) [28]. We introduce a mechanism to allow
for traits to be related to each other below.
A shortcoming of using the Axelrod model to
represent survey data is a tendency toward uniform
convergence in the final state as the number of fea-
tures increase. Given that attitudes are negotiated
properties of social interaction [29], it is plausible
to assume that people hold a broad range of contin-
uous positions on a given attitude. However, we are
interested in how attitudes are communicated. Peo-
ple typically communicate attitudes verbally, which
leads to a certain level of imprecision in their inter-
pretation [30, 31]. We argue that by scaling opinions
to a limited number of points on a continuous scale,
surveys capture general limitations in attitude com-
munication and interpretation. Furthermore, contin-
uous variable models show a tendency for opinions
to move towards the mid-point of the scale [32, 33]
and thereby fail to capture the stubbornness of ex-
tremists [34].
In the standard Axelrod model above, if two
neighbours interact, the node originally chosen
copies the state of one of its neighbour’s features that
they do not already agree on. We argue that purely
copying an attitude of an individual with whom you
interact even if you strongly disagree with this atti-
tude is unrealistic. Hence, we introduce an agree-
ment threshold, a, analogous to a latitude of accep-
tance [29] to compute the interactions. The idea is
that there exists a range of positions a person is will-
ing to hold with this range being anchored by their
current position within which they copy.
Instead of interacting with someone with prob-
ability proportional to the number of common fea-
tures, we now calculate the probability to interact as
the number of features within this agreement thresh-
old over the total number of features, with interac-
tion leading to a copying of one of those traits (i.e.,
only traits within the agreement threshold can be
copied).
Once the state to copy is chosen, it only copies
if the difference in values of the chosen feature be-
tween interacting individuals i and j is less than the
threshold, |fk,i − fk,j | ≤ a. For example, if the
threshold is set to the smallest difference between
response options in a survey scale, then only those
who are one point away from each other on the sur-
vey scale will interact.
In contrast with standard Axelrod, here the prob-
ability for interaction between two nodes is in-
creased when the agreement threshold is included as
features which are a traits away now add to the prob-
ability for interaction. However, when interaction
occurs, the only features that can change are those
within the agreement threshold. In standard Axelrod
once interaction happens one feature will be copied,
thereby increasing the probability of interaction in
the future. In this version only the features which
are already within the agreement threshold change,
meaning the probability for interaction in the future
is the same (unless a trait is changed by a different
neighbour).
Figure 3 displays the final state for the lattice and
bipartite visualisations of this model with F = 6,
q = 3 with the lowest possible agreement thresh-
old a = 1. For standard Axelrod, this would lead
to consensus, however, here we see we have differ-
ent regions and from the bipartite representation, half
of the six features do not reach consensus. This is
a simple adjustment to standard Axelrod that yields
more than one cluster even where the number of fea-
tures exceeds the number of traits per feature as they
would in a typical survey.
Projections
Visualising Axelrod on a bipartite space helps us
realise that projections can be made to observe the
connections between feature-trait combinations and
nodes. A 1-mode projection can be generated show-
ing features as nodes with an edge indicating that
two features are held concurrently by an agent, and
therefore overall which attitudes are strongly con-
nected.
The projection for F = 6, q = 3 is shown in
Fig. 4 where the weight of an edge is the number
of pairs of nodes that share that feature-trait com-
bination. These are split in thirds from weakest to
strongest for visualisation purposes. The strongest
edges are between the three attitudes where consen-
5f1_q1 f1_q2 f1_q3
f2_q1 f2_q2 f2_q3
f3_q1 f3_q2 f3_q3 f4_q1 f4_q2 f4_q3
f5_q1 f5_q2 f5_q3
f6_q1 f6_q2 f6_q3
FIG. 3. The lattice and bipartite visualisation for the final state of Axelrod with the lowest agreement threshold on the
traits for F = 6 and q = 3. Three of the features reach consensus in this realisation.
f1_q3
f2_q2
f3_q1
f3_q3
f4_q1
f4_q3
f5_q2
f6_q1
f6_q3
FIG. 4. The attitude-space from fig.3. White edges repre-
sent the top third strongest edge weighs, blue the middle
third and red the weakest third of the edges. Here we see
that the three attitudes for which consensus was reached
above have the strongest edges as more nodes hold them
in common.
sus is reached as these are held together most com-
monly.
Figure 5 shows the 1-mode projection for agents
where agents are nodes, linked if they share an atti-
tude in common. The colour of the edge represents
how many attitudes they share, and we can identify a
number of clusters where they share all six attitudes
(with white edges). Note that this figure only dis-
plays the giant component. As the edges are created
by shared links, if a node has no features in com-
mon with any other node, it will not be connected
and therefore not appear in any clusters.
Number of Clusters
To count the number of clusters, we count the
number of components where the nodes agree on all
F features in the final state. (Note that for larger sys-
tems, and larger agreement thresholds, it can make
sense to count clusters that differ by one instead of
assuming they all agree, however, here we are just
taking the most simplified approach initially).
Fig. 6 shows the average number of clusters for
varying features for the agreement-threshold model
with q = 5 (left) and q = 7 (right) for 1,000 runs
with 100 nodes. For small a, as F increases the av-
erage number of clusters increases as there is a much
larger feature-trait space. Due to the large number of
different opinion based groups, it is harder for large
clusters to form so the cluster size gets smaller. As
a increases, there are more conversions and thus less
clusters in the final state.
As fig. 6 focussed on the mean of 1,000 runs, we
next display the density plot showing the distribution
of the number of clusters for one feature in fig. 7.
The left panel shows the change in the number of
clusters in increasing a with 4 features and 5 traits.
In the right panel we increase to 8 features. Again we
observe as a increases the number of clusters reduces
to as there are more conversions and larger groups.
For low agreement thresholds however, there are a
much larger number of clusters and with large F ,
there are very few large clusters with many isolates
who don’t have the same feature-trait combination as
6FIG. 5. The node-space projection (giant component) from fig.3. Here, two nodes are linked if they hold an attitude
in common. White links represent nodes agreeing on all six attitudes, blue edges represent five common attitudes, and
red represent three or four.
FIG. 6. The mean number of clusters per feature for q = 5 (left) and q = 7 (right) for different values of the agreement
threshold a. Each point is the mean number of clusters from 1,000 simulations. As the number of features increases,
the number of clusters also increases but the size of the clusters decrease.
any other nodes.
Finally, in fig. 8 we increase the system size to
1,024 with q = 7. In the left panel we observe the
same change in mean number of clusters per feature
as in fig. 6. In the right panel, we show the density
plot, there is a larger jump between a = 1 and a = 2
when the system size increases.
Note that for agreement threshold a = q − 1,
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FIG. 7. The probability density showing the distribution of the number of clusters for 1,000 simulations with q = 5
and varying the agreement threshold a. The figure on the left has F = 4 on the right F = 8. As the number of features
increases, larger clusters are harder to form as there is a much larger feature-space to agree on.
0 100 200 300 400 500
Number of Clusters
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
Pr
ob
ab
ilit
y 
de
ns
ity
q = 7, F = 4
a = 1
a = 2
a = 3
FIG. 8. The mean number of clusters per feature for q = 7 (left) and the probability density for the number of clusters
for q = 7 and F = 4 (right) for a system with N = 1024. The behaviour is similar for larger systems.
every interaction will lead to copying so this will
quickly yield full consensus. Also note that in all
these simulations, due to interactions now occurring
when agents have a similar trait instead of exactly
the same as in standard Axelrod, these tend to reach
their final state faster than standard Axelrod.
CONCLUSION
Here, we added an agreement threshold to the
Axelrod model. This threshold yields many clusters
for small values of q. This addition is an adjustment
to standard Axelrod interaction rules that only allow
those with similar features to influence each other.
The resulting model is suited to natively modelling
survey data, which frequently consists of Likert-type
responses, since only ranking and swapping opera-
tions are required thus respecting the ordinal nature
of the data. The model also avoids the homogoneous
end-state which tends to be the case when the stan-
dard Axelrod model is used on survey-type data, as
there are almost always features than traits (i.e. more
items than response options).
In this model, extremists are less likely to change
their position than moderates. Due to the agreement
threshold, an agent with an attitude on either extreme
can only move in one direction, an agent in the mid-
dle can move in either direction so is twice as likely
change their position. This helps with avoiding a
8problem some models have causing agents to move
towards a centrist attitude and achieving polarisation
[35]. This behaviour is also observed in real social
systems [34].
Here, this model is entirely theoretical and uses
random seeding of the initial system on a regular lat-
tice. Going forward we would like to use empirical
data to seed the initial values rather than randomly
assign them, something which is used in the follow-
ing approaches to Axelrod models [11–14].
Further work needs to be done on testing this
method on topologies other than a lattice. Similarly,
varying q per feature should be tested as there is no
reason the number of traits per feature should be the
same. This last suggestion is made in [11]. A further
extension could specify that if the agreement thresh-
old is larger than one, the traits move towards each
other rather than one agent copying the other. We
also wish to relax the rules for group membership,
here we took groups where everyone agrees with ev-
eryone, however, going forward we wish to investi-
gate this with agreement on a smaller number of core
attitudes. In this case we would get larger clusters
similar to when F is in the middle range of fig. 6.
Future work will seed this extended Axelrod
model with real survey data to compare the sensi-
tivity or resilience of various real-world attitude net-
work topologies to cultural diffusion. We expect that
it will be relatively straightforward to make similar
modifications to other opinion dynamics models to
allow the consideration of survey-type data.
The code to run bipartite simulations and
the agreement threshold can be found here:
https://github.com/pmaccarron/
Agreement-Threshold-Axelrod
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